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ECONOMISTS  HAVE  ATTEMPTED  TO  ESTIMATE  potential  gross  national 
product for over a decade now. Potential GNP  measures the output the 
economy would produce if it were operating at some fixed, fairly low level 
of unemployment, usually defined by an aggregate unemployment rate of 
about 4 percent. The difference between potential and actual GNP at any 
point in time is known as the GNP gap. In 1962, Arthur Okun published an 
analysis that has been the benchmark for official measures of potential 
GNP ever since, and in the process enunciated what came to be known as 
Okun's law, which relates the unemployment rate to the percentage GNP 
gap.' Potential GNP and Okun's law became two of the handiest tools of 
analysis and presentation for economic stabilization problems. Particularly 
during the first half of the 1960s, when GNP was running below potential 
and policy was devoted to closing the gap, no sophisticated analysis of the 
economy failed to identify the loss in real output that was associated with 
an economy falling short of full employment. 
The careful estimation of the  full employment surplus in the federal 
budget has been an important by-product of the estimation of potential 
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GNP.2 By estimating the revenues and expenditures that would be gener- 
ated by the economy operating at its potential level, and comparing these 
with actual revenues and expenditures, one can determine with a useful 
degree of precision that part of a budget surplus or deficit attributable to 
cyclical deviations in the economy around potential. Medium-term pro- 
jections  of  the  economy  have  also  come  to  depend  on  projections of 
potential GNP. The last two reports of the Council of Economic Advisers 
have used the concept in this way, projecting the total GNP that would be 
available in future years and the various end uses to which it could be put 
under alternative economic policies. 
The attempts over the last decade to  quantify potential output have 
focused attention on two important matters: the implications, in terms of 
lost  output, incomes, and revenues, of operating the economy below its 
potential level; and the changes that could be expected in the growth rate 
of  the  economy's  potential  as  a  result  of  changes in  the  factors that 
underlie it. 
Corresponding to the two kinds of analytic insights just mentioned are 
two basic ways of approaching the measurement of potential output. One 
can  analyze the relation between the  GNP  gap and the unemployment 
rate at any moment of time. This approach involves estimating the differ- 
ences in employment, average  hours worked by each employee, and average 
productivity of each employee that would accompany the difference be- 
tween the actual and target unemployment rate. Or one can start from a 
benchmark period for which potential output is known, and estimate the 
changes in potential output for other years from information about the 
sources of these changes. Although some fairly elaborate models of eco- 
nomic growth have been used for this purpose, this procedure, at its sim- 
plest, involves estimating the changes in the labor force and hence employ- 
ment, in average  hours worked by the employed, and in output per manhour 
that have prevailed or can be expected to prevail along the potential path. 
In  his  original article, Okun wedded these  approaches to  measuring 
potential. He came out with estimates, first, of how potential output grew 
through time, and, second, of how the gap between potential and actual 
GNP was related to the unemployment rate at a particular time-Okun's 
law. According to  Okun's law, the percentage GNP  gap is a little over 
three times the excess of the unemployment rate over 4 percent, where 
2. See, for example,  Arthur  M. Okun and Nancy H. Teeters,  "The  Full Employment 
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potential is defined as the output the economy would produce with 4 per- 
cent unemployment. 
In describing the other approach to the problem-measuring  the ingre- 
dients of growth in the economy's potential output year by year-Okun 
found a trend growth rate of 3.5 percent a year during the years covered by 
his study (1954-62) and, in simplest form, decomposed this growth into a 
1.2 percent and a 2.3 percent annual rate of growth in the labor force and 
in output per man employed, respectively, estimates that took account of a 
gradual decline in average hours worked per man during the period. 
As economic expansion narrowed the GNP gap that had existed at the 
time  Okun  made  these  estimates,  both  these  methods  of  estimating 
potential GNP  stood up very well. By the middle of the decade, the gap 
had been closed  and actual GNP  corresponded to  estimated potential. 
But since 1965, some unexpected things have happened to the determinants 
of potential GNP. 
After growing at nearly the predicted potential rate of 1.2 percent during 
the previous decade, the labor force grew at an average annual rate of 
almost 2.4 percent between 1965 and 1970. With the simplified formula that 
allows for a 2.3 percent trend growth rate in output per man, an expansion 
this rapid in the potential labor force would indicate a 4.7 percent annual 
growth in potential GNP  over the interval. This rate is much faster than 
anyone had projected and much faster than that which actually developed, 
despite falling unemployment rates over most of the period. 
However, during these same years, the unexpected surge in labor force 
growth was accompanied by an equally unexpected dip in average hours 
worked per employee, and disappointing growth in actual labor produc- 
tivity. In Table 1, the actual changes in the labor force, average hours of 
Table 1.  Annual  Growth  Rates of Labor Force, Weekly Hours, and 
Output per Manhour, 1948-70 
Percentage 
Average  Output 
Labor  weekly  per 
Period  force  hours  manhour 
1948-55  1.49  -0.47  3.45 
1955-65  1.16  -0.39  2.75 
1965-70  2.35  -0.78  1.63 
Sources: For labor force data, see appendix; other series are calculated by the author from data supplied 
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work, and productivity over this period are compared with their changes 
in earlier years. The surprises in hours of work and productivity affected 
output growth in the opposite direction from the surge in the labor force. 
As  a result, until 1969, Okun's law kept working well in relation to the 
official estimates of potential. 
Official estimates, reflected in the Economic Report of the President and 
in the Census Bureau publication, Business Conditions  Digest, accept the 
methodology  of adding trend productivity growth to  the growth of the 
potential manhours of labor input in the economy in order to measure 
the growth of potential output. But the official estimates of these compo- 
nents of potential output growth are periodically adjusted to reflect devel- 
opments in actual output and unemployment. They indicate that potential 
output grew at an average annual rate of about 4 percent from 1965 to 
1970. This downward adjustment from the naive 4.7 percent growth pro- 
jection  is in the right direction, but the justification for it is not  clear. 
Which of the changes shown in Table 1 are likely to represent new trends 
in the components of potential output growth, which are likely to prove 
transitory, and how do they add up to a quantitative estimate of current 
potential GNP? 
The performance of productivity over this interval is of particular in- 
terest in itself. Changes in the productivity trend have important implica- 
tions for the level of profits in the economy3 and for the distribution of 
income more generally. They are significant for understanding inflation 
since the productivity trend determines  the translation of hourly wage costs 
into standard wage costs per unit of output, which constitute the prime 
determinant of price movements.4 
Elements  of GNP Growth 
WEIGHTED  LABOR FORCE VARIABLES 
In a recent paper I discussed the significance of the changing age-sex 
composition of the pool of unemployed workers for the question of infla- 
tion.5 I  noted that large and persistent differences exist in the effective 
3. Arthur M.  Okun and George L. Perry, "Notes and Numbers on the Profits 
Squeeze," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (3:1970),  pp. 466-72. 
4. Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  Brookings  Papers on 
Economic Activity (1:1971),  pp.  105-58. 
5. George L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  Brookings  Papers  on 
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labor supply offered by individuals in the several age-sex groups. In order 
to take account of these differences, the average wage and average number 
of hours worked per week by individuals in the various groups were used 
to weight the number of individuals in each group. This led to the concept 
of a weighted unemployment rate, defined as the ratio of weighted total 
unemployment to  the  weighted total  labor  force.  The  same weighting 
adjustments are even more directly relevant for measuring the real labor 
input associated with a given employment  total. So it is natural to conduct 
an analysis of productivity and potential output in these terms. 
The effect of the changing composition of employment has always been 
implicitly accounted for in past studies of potential output growth. Changes 
in  the  relative composition  of  employment that  change  average labor 
productivity or average hours worked per man become one element deter- 
mining the average trend in these sources of growth. But if the composi- 
tional change is not proceeding at a steady rate, it becomes important to 
take explicit account of its effect in  order to  isolate other changes that 
may be taking place. In order to do this, I have used relative wages and 
hours of work to weight the various labor force groups. Because employ- 
ment  and  average hours  are  generally treated separately in  analyzing 
potential output growth, it seemed most natural to weight employment by 
the relative wages of the age-sex groups and to use differences in average 
hours among groups to help explain the observed movements in economy- 
wide  average hours.  Weighted employment thus  refers to  the  sum  of 
wage-weighted employment for each age-sex group, with the wage weights 
corresponding to the relative wages earned by the average worker in each 
age-sex group. These wage weights are proxies for the relative productivi- 
ties of workers. In the weighted employment total,  an employee whose 
productivity  (as measured by his wage) is only half the average productivity 
of all workers gets only half weight. 
Since the composition of the work force has been shifting continually 
toward relatively more women and young workers, individuals who have 
relatively low wage weights, the growth rate of weighted employment is 
lower than that of officially measured employment throughout the postwar 
period. But while the difference between the growth rate of the two mea- 
sures averaged about 0.2 percentage point until 1965, it became 0.5 per- 
centage point during the 1965-70 period. This change makes it especially 
important to use'  the weighted employment variable in analyzing the trend 
of productivity and potential output in recent years. 
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more carefully, I have used the weighted labor force concepts to conduct 
a new analysis covering the whole postwar period. This involves estimating 
the  trend growth of  labor force participation rates, average hours per 
worker, and productivity along the  potential path,  and their departure 
from trend values associated with operating at output levels other than 
potential GNP. Taking explicit account of labor force composition turns 
out to provide new information on these estimates of potential and assists 
understanding of the recent behavior of productivity. 
PARTICIPATION  RATES 
For some groups in the population, notably women and young workers, 
the fraction of the population that is in the labor force has varied sub- 
stantially over the postwar period. These labor force participation rates 
vary cyclically, with a larger fraction of the population in the labor force 
when unemployment is low than when it is high. They also vary through 
time for reasons that are independent of the unemployment rate. Over 
most of the postwar period, participation rates in these groups have risen. 
While both  the cyclical sensitivity and the rising trend of  participation 
rates stand out clearly in the data, the precise forces governing participation 
rates are complex. They can be approximated only crudely by statistical 
relations that try to explain participation rates in terms of unemployment 
rates and a time trend. However, it is impossible to take explicit account 
of all the things that should help explain participation rates. And estimates 
of the potential labor force are needed.6 
As  a necessary compromise, I have let actual labor force growth tell 
most of the story. The first step was to estimate participation rate equations 
of the following form: 
(1)  (pt)  =  A +a(l  (1-ut)  +  bi log  Tt, 
6. The labor force and employment  data and the data on average  hours of work that 
are  used in this paper  are  based  on data  supplied  by Edward  F. Denison from a draft  of a 
forthcoming  study. They are derived  primarily  from  the establishment-based  data of the 
Office  of Business  Economics,  which  are published  in July  issues  of the Survey  of Current 
Business,  with additions made for workers  not covered by the establishment  data in 
order  to make  the labor input  total comparable  with the output  total represented  by real 
GNP. The appendix  describes  how I matched  these data to the official  labor force series 
adjusted  for definition  and census benchmark  changes in order to allocate the total 
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where 
L  =  labor  force 
P  =  population 
i =  subscript designating age-sex groups 
t  =  dating subscript 
A  =  a constant 
u* =  weighted unemployment rate as defined above, with 1 -  u*, the 
weighted unemployment rate, taken as a measure of labor mar- 
ket tightness 
log T =  a time-trend term in which T equals 100 in the first quarter of 
1948 and rises by 4 each year. 
A  separate equation was estimated for each age-sex group from annual 
data fitted to  1948-69. The estimates are given in the appendix.7 
Generally, equations of this form are used to  estimate potential par- 
ticipation rates by setting the employment rate at its potential value and 
solving for the participation rate in each year.8 This simply allows the 
estimated time trend to determine the path of potential participation rates. 
Rather than doing this, I have used the employment rate coefficient, ai, 
to adjust the actual participation rate each year to an estimated potential 
level for that year. The difference  between the actual and potential weighted 
employment rate is multiplied by a,  to get the estimated marginal change 
in participation rates that would have come from being at the potential 
unemployment rate. Thus the time trend in equation (1) serves simply as 
the best available variable to use in arriving at an accurate estimate of the 
effect of unemployment on participation rates. Since factors affecting the 
trend of the potential labor force should be expected to affect the actual 
labor force as well, this procedure should yield more sensible estimates, 
particularly for the crucial period of the late 1960s. In that period, unem- 
ployment was near its potential level, thus minimizing the error from the 
marginal adjustment that is made. 
7. Equations  using lagged as well as current  employment  rates were tried, but the 
lagged  terms  were  insignificant.  I also tried  the employment  rate squared,  both adding  it 
to equation (1) and using it by itself, to see if the effect was nonlinear,  but it was not. 
Equations  using  the conventional  unemployment  rate  in place of u*  gave slightly  inferior 
fits. 
8. N. J. Simler  and Alfred  Tella, "Labor  Reserves  and the Phillips  Curve,"  Review  of 
Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 50 (February  1968),  pp. 32-49; and Gordon, "Inflation  in 
Recession  and Recovery,"  especially  Appendix  B, pp. 149-53. 540  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
This way of estimating makes a big difference  in recent years when actual 
participation rates have climbed much faster than any equation fitted to 
earlier periods would have predicted. Had predictions been made directly 
from the equation, the potential labor force would have been estimated 
well below the actual labor force, even after adjustment of the actual labor 
force for unemployment experience in the period. Perhaps a one-year surge 
in participation rates could have been regarded as aberrant and as irrele- 
vant to an estimate of the trend of potential. But after five years of such ex- 
perience, one must accept the verdict of the  actual data. The fact that 
lagged employment rates and nonlinear forms of  the  employment rate 
were not useful variables in the equation further strengthens the presump- 
tion  that  a change in  the trend of  participation rates occurred in  this 
period. 
After potential participation rates for each year for each age-sex group 
were estimated in the manner just described, the potential labor force was 
projected separately for each group by multiplying its potential participa- 
tion rate by its population in each year. The total  potential labor force 
series is given in the appendix. 
The effect of  unemployment on  the  overall labor force participation 
rate varies through time with the changing composition of the work force. 
For  recent years, the estimates indicate that  a drop of  one percentage 
point in the official unemployment rate would induce an increase of 500,000 
in the labor force. Thus, taking account of this enlarged labor force, an 
employment increase of 1,340,000  workers, or 1.6 percent, would be needed 
to reduce the unemployment rate 1 percentage point. 
POTENTIAL  WEIGHTED  EMPLOYMENT 
Potential employment was calculated using the estimates of each group's 
potential labor force together with an estimate of what each group's unem- 
ployment rate would be along the potential path each year. These unem- 
ployment rate estimates were made by adjusting each year's actual un- 
employment rate for each group as described in the appendix. Just as in 
calculating actual weighted employment, potential employment in  each 
group was multiplied by the relative wage for the group, and these esti- 
mates were added over all age-sex groups to arrive at potential weighted 
employment for the whole economy. George L. Perry  541 
AVERAGE  HOURS 
Over the postwar period, the average hours worked per year per em- 
ployee show clear cyclical fluctuations as well as a persistent downward 
trend. The cyclical fluctuations demonstrate mainly that employers vary 
average hours as well as employment in response to changes in their own 
demand for labor. Higher unemployment rates mean less overtime and an 
increase in  short workweeks of  employment. To  a  smaller extent, the 
cyclical fluctuation in average hours may reflect some relative shift in em- 
ployment  away  from  manufacturing industries, where  average weekly 
hours  are high,  and toward less  cyclically sensitive industries, such as 
retail sales and services, where the  standard workweek is  shorter. The 
downward trend in average  hours that is apparent once cyclical fluctuations 
are accounted for  has  not  proceeded at the  same rate throughout the 
postwar period. Through the mid-1950s, the downtrend was relatively fast 
as manufacturing industries moved to a standard forty-hour week. After 
that time, there was little further drift in the standard  manufacturing  work- 
week, and the economy-wide downtrend in average hours slowed. Then, 
surprisingly, average hours declined sharply again in the 1965-68 period. 
Because there are persistent differences  in the relative number of average 
hours worked by different age-sex groups in the labor force, the changing 
mix  of  employment contributes to  the  trend in  economy-wide  average 
hours of work. In order to isolate underlying trends in average hours from 
the effects of the changing employment mix, I eliminated the annual change 
in hours that was due purely to changes in the relative mix in employment. 
The resulting series was then explained by its statistical relationship to the 
weighted unemployment rate and time trends. The best-fitting equation for 
the postwar period was 
(2)  AHI  =  43.45  -  0.195u*  -  0.209TI,  +  0.073T2,  -  0.135T3t, 
(-6.68)  (-11.17)  (2.92)  (-2.81) 
W2  = 0.986; standard  error = 0.125; Durbin-Watson  =  1.50. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
where AH is average hours worked per week, u* is the weighted unemploy- 
ment rate, and the Ts are separate time-trend variables. In the equation, T1 
and T2 begin in 1947 and 1955, respectively, and continue throughout the 
period; T3 runs from 1966 to 1968 and remains at its 1968 level thereafter. 
These time-trend variables explain the data better than any alternative I 
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The last trend variable, T3, is clearly contrived to fit the data, and I have 
no  independent reason to justify it. That it was needed even with data 
cleansed of employment mix effects is evidence that the 1965-68 decline in 
average hours is based on much more than the sharp rise in the employ- 
ment of workers from age-sex categories with short workweeks. I con- 
ducted some other tests that convinced me that the recent decline in hours 
should be treated as  a permanent change in the  level  of  the trend. In 
particular, it did not appear that employers were reacting to the very tight 
labor markets of these years by hiring more employees than they normally 
would have in case they would be needed later, compensating by reducing 
average hours of work more than they normally would. If this had been 
the case, it should have shown up in the statistics on involuntary part-time 
employment. The fraction of workers on part time for economic reasons 
is  historically  closely  related  to  the  unemployment  rate.  Regressions 
showed that, during these years, the historical relationship continues to 
explain this category of  part-time employment with no  unusual errors. 
Equation (2) should already account for normal effects of the changing 
composition of employment. To check further, I ran regressions on volun- 
tary part-time employment as a fraction of total  employment for each 
age-sex group. This fraction is inversely related to the unemployment rate, 
indicating that  a  greater-than-average proportion  of  marginal workers 
choose to work part time. Once that source of variation is accounted for, 
there remains a clear increase during the  last half  of  the  1960s in  the 
proportion of employment that is voluntarily part time in each age-sex 
group taken separately. The composition change adds to this decline. 
The trend in average hours indicated by equation (2) was adjusted by 
adding back the changes due to  mix effect that would  occur along the 
potential path. Because the separate time trends give abrupt changes in 
this path of potential average manhours, the final series was smoothed by 
forming centered three-year moving averages for use in estimating poten- 
tial GNP. 
According to these estimates, a fall of 1 percentage point in the weighted 
unemployment rate causes a 0.20 hour rise in average weekly hours worked 
per employee; or, equivalently, there is a 0.18 hour rise for a fall of  1 
percentage point  in the  official unemployment rate. The time trends in 
equation (2) indicate that, with a constant weighted unemployment rate, 
average weekly hours fall by 0.21 hour per year from 1948 to  1955, by George  L. Perry  543 
0.14 hour per year from 1955 to 1965, by 0.27 hour per year from 1965 to 
1968, and by 0.14 hour per year thereafter.9 
OUTPUT  GROWTH  PATHS 
The estimates of potential weighted unemployment and potential average 
hours worked per employee just described provide the basis for calculating 
the economy's potential labor input. It will be measured by weighted po- 
tential manhours, defined as the product of  weighted employment and 
average hours, both calculated along the potential path. The next step is to 
use this labor input measure to analyze the behavior of productivity in the 
economy, and from there to analyze potential output. 
An  awkward problem of terminology now arises. I want to retain the 
accepted normative definition of potential output as the output that would 
be produced with the economy  operating at around a 4 percent official 
unemployment rate. Thus the modifier "potential" will continue to refer 
to magnitudes defined along a path corresponding to  a constant official 
unemployment rate. But analytically, it becomes more natural for some 
purposes to  work with the growth path defined by a constant weighted 
unemployment rate. So I shall use the modifier "trend" to refer to magni- 
tudes defined along a growth path corresponding to a constant weighted 
unemployment rate. Both the trend and potential paths are defined to pass 
through the actual real GNP level in the third quarter of 1955, a conven- 
tion that defines the unemployment rate along the potential path to  be 
3.87 percent with the labor force data used here and the weighted unem- 
ployment rate along the trend path to be 3.37 percent.10 
Because of gradual changes in the age-sex composition of total unem- 
ployment, the official unemployment rate has been rising gradually along 
the employment path defined by a constant weighted unemployment rate. 
9. The time trends  in equation  (2) decline  by a constant  amount  each year  rather  than 
a constant  percentage.  Thus  the percentage  decline  they project  would  gradually  increase, 
but I would have no confidence  in projecting  so far ahead with this equation  that this 
effect  became  important. 
10. These  unemployment  rates  are based  on data  that include  the armed  forces  in em- 
ployment  and the labor force and that are adjusted  for census  benchmark  revisions  and 
definition  changes,  as discussed  in the appendix.  At present,  the official  unemployment 
rate corresponding  to the potential  path is 4.05 percent.  The values  of weighted  employ- 
ment  and average  hours  along  the trend  path  are  estimated  in a manner  exactly  analogous 
to the estimates  made  along  the potential  path that are described  above. 544  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
Thus potential output and trend output differ by noticeable amounts. But 
it  makes little difference whether the  analytics described here are con- 
ducted along the trend path and then adjusted to  potential, as I do, or 
conducted along the potential path in the first place. 
A Model of Productivity  and Output 
The procedure for estimating trend GNP  starts by wedding proposi- 
tions about the behavior of labor productivity, and applies them to wage- 
weighted  employment  rather  than  to  employment  as  conventionally 
measured. These propositions correspond to the two ways of viewing the 
concept of trend GNP:  as a fairly smooth growth path passing through 
years when GNP is known to have been at its trend level (a growth view); 
and as a predictable relationship between the deviation of GNP from its 
trend and the weighted unemployment rate (a  gap view). The simplest 
version of the model will be explained first and then some elaborations of 
it will be reported. 
The proposition that, along the trend output path, weighted labor pro- 
ductivity grows at a constant rate is expressed by the formula 
(3)  M  =  BerTt. 
Here Q and H are the hypothetical levels of output (real GNP) and labor 
input (weighted trend manhours) along the growth trend of the economy 
defined by a constant (low) weighted unemployment rate. The trend of 
weighted labor productivity grows at the rate r each year; T is a time trend; 
and B is a constant. 
The proposition that, in any given year, weighted labor productivity is 
higher the higher the level of labor input can be expressed directly by a 
formula such as 
(4) 
= 
where b is expected to be greater than 1.  In this equation, Q and H are 
again the hypothetical levels of output and labor input at trend, while Q 
and H are the observed levels of output and labor input at that same point George L. Perry  545 
in time. This equation is equivalent to  a relation expressed directly in 
terms of weighted labor productivity, P, of the following form: 
(4a)  (H)6 
The combining of the growth and gap equations, (3) and (4), results in an 
equation from which to  estimate the  growth rate,  r,  and the  propor- 
tionality factor, b, using only the trend labor input estimated earlier and 
actual, observable data on output and labor input: 
(5)  Qt  =  BerTt H11bHb. 
For estimation purposes, this equation is expressed in logarithmic form: 
(6)  log (Q) -  log B +  rTt +  b log ()  . 
CHANGES  IN  TREND  PRODUCTIVITY 
Although the weighted productivity trend may grow smoothly, the as- 
sumption that  its  growth rate  never changed throughout  the  postwar 
period, as implied by equation (3), may be too restrictive. In particular, 
aggregate production functions for the economy that explicitly measure 
the input of capital as well as of  labor result in estimates of  potential 
labor productivity that  depend on  the  size  of  the capital stock  at  any 
time.11 Such models imply that, other factors being equal, the growth rate 
of labor productivity will be positively related to the growth rate of the 
capital stock with which labor works. In practice, attempts to  measure 
such aggregate production functions have not led to  estimates of labor 
productivity that show sharp changes in its growth rate over the postwar 
period. Changes in the capital-labor ratio, the infusion of new technology, 
and improvements in the average education of the work force-the  major 
influences on labor productivity-come  about only gradually. 
Still, the assumption of  a completely unchanged rate of productivity 
growth along the  trend path may be too  restrictive. Equation (6)  was 
11. Lester  C. Thurow  and L. D. Taylor,  "The  Interaction  between  the Actual  and the 
Potential Rates of Growth," Review  of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 48 (November 
1966),  pp. 351-60; and Robert M. Solow, "Technical  Progress,  Capital  Formation,  and 
Economic  Growth,"  in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of the 
Seventy-fourth  Annual  Meeting,  1961 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 52, May 1962), 
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estimated separately for various subperiods of the postwar years in order 
to  see if noticeable differences in the estimated productivity trend could 
be observed. Differences did arise but, invariably, changes in the estimates 
of r, the productivity trend, went along with changes in the estimate of b, 
the cyclical productivity term. This was particularly noticeable when sub- 
periods were broken at extremes of cyclical peaks or troughs such as 1953, 
indicating that the statistical estimates were confusing the two sources of 
change in actual labor productivity. In order to minimize this problem, the 
equations were constrained to keep the cyclical response of productivity 
measured by  b unchanged throughout the period, while permitting the 
trend of productivity, r, to  vary by introducing additional time trends. 
The new estimating equation embodying these assumptions is 
(7)  log  Q)  =  log B +  riTi, +  r2T2t  +  r3T3t  +  b log ()H. 
The several productivity terms, ri,  r2,  and r3,  are additive for all times 
when their corresponding time indexes are nonzero. To examine the pos- 
sibility that the productivity trend changed at various times during the 
postwar period, the periods for starting the time indexes were varied. This 
method of scanning the data for possible interruptions in the productivity 
trend invites the discovery of breaks that may be spurious. The estimates 
obtained must be viewed with this in mind. On the other hand, the failure 
to  achieve improvement in statistical fit with the additional time trends 
would be fairly strong evidence that the trend growth of productivity did 
not vary noticeably over the period. 
VARIATION  IN  GAP  RESPONSE 
Equation (4a) implies that, at a given time, weighted labor productivity 
will be greater the higher the level of labor input. This tendency has been 
widely observed. But it is less clear that the productivity improvement 
should continue at the same rate as employment levels are pushed higher 
and  higher.  Should  the  productivity gain  available from  operating at 
5 percent rather than 6 percent unemployment rates be expected to be the 
same as the improvement available in operating at 3 percent rather than 
4 percent unemployment? 
Many factors contribute to the increased productivity that is observed. 
Within a given industry, some employment is of an overhead nature, vary- 
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whole, industries whose production and employment are cyclically more 
sensitive experience, on the  average, higher levels of labor productivity 
than most others; thus as these high-productivity industries increase their 
relative share of  total  employment,  economy-wide  average labor  pro- 
ductivity increases. It  is worth noting that the weighting of  employees 
that has been used in this study could be expected partly to offset this last 
effect since  the  workers in  industries with  high  labor  productivity are 
relatively high-weight workers; this  means that  the  effect identified as 
productivity change in studies with body-count measures of employment 
will be captured here, in part at least, as a change in weighted employment 
rather than in productivity. On the other hand, the overhead labor effect 
will probably appear more strongly in the present study, since technical 
and supervisory personnel, whose employment experiences cyclical varia- 
tions below the average, tend to be high-weight individuals. 
There are also forces working to reduce average labor productivity as 
employment levels rise, most notably the likelihood that the marginally un- 
employed at any time constitute a labor group with lower average skills 
than their employed counterparts. But most of this effect should disappear 
when labor input is measured by weighted employment. 
It is beyond the scope of my purpose in this paper to try to  sort out 
each of these effects. But I have tried to test whether their net effect changes 
as employment levels move nearer to  potential and as they move above 
potential, as they did in recent years and during the Korean war period. 
In order to  test this possibility, equation (4) was modified to  allow the 
proportionality factor, b, to  vary with the level of weighted unemploy- 
ment, u*, giving the following equation: 
(8)  (Q)  =  (H)bl+b2u* 
In this form of the equation, the sum b1 +  b2u* gives the proportionality 
factor applicable at any time. If productivity increments become smaller 
the lower the unemployment rate, then bi and b2 will both have positive 
signs. The estimating equation in logarithmic form, which now embodies 
both the possibility of variations in the long-run productivity trend and 
the adjustment  just described, is 
(9)  log  Q  =  log B +  riTit +  r2T2t  +  r3T3t  +  bi log (H) 
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LAGS  IN  CYCLICAL  RESPONSE 
The equations used thus far make no allowance for cyclical lags in the 
employment of labor. Reductions in the unemployment rate are known to 
lag behind a cyclical upturn. This situation reflects in part an increase in 
average hours of work that substitutes for an increase in employment. Also, 
there have been periods, such as 1956 and 1969, when productivity growth 
was interrupted following  a  substantial cyclical upswing. Some part of 
this interruption  is due to the increasing employment of secondary workers 
at that stage of the cycle. This part of the effect would disappear with the 
labor input measure used here since it weights employment to eliminate 
productivity differences among workers and thus permits tests for those 
true lags in productivity that exist. Unfortunately, the use of annual data 
will reveal only substantial  lags, and some genuine cyclical characteristics  of 
the relation between output and labor input may be lost. 
The change in the labor input gap was introduced into equation (4) to 
account for lag effects,12  yielding 
(10)  (,  )  =tH 
(10)  (Q)t  @)~t  _[H)t  (H)t_,_ 
With allowance made again for  changes in the  productivity trend, this 
addition now leads to the estimating equation in logarithmic form 
(11)  log 
tO 
log B +  riTit +  r2T2,  +  r3T3,  +  b log  H 
+  c [log ()  -  log ()  I 
Statistical  Estimates 
ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTIVITY 
The estimates of  the  various forms of  the  model just  discussed and 
shown in Table 2 permit a comparison of  some  alternative hypotheses 
about the behavior of productivity. One kind of comparison is among the 
three forms of equations. It permits selection, from among the gap-type 
specifications, of the form that best captures the relation between output 
12. Lageffects could also be introduced  by a change  term such as Ht/Ht-1. This im- 
plies  a slightly  different  response  when  the growth  rate  of H changes.  Estimates  using  this 
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and labor input at a given point in time. A second kind of comparison is 
among the different time intervals chosen in fitting productivity trends. 
This  comparison offers a  test  of  whether productivity trends changed 
noticeably during the postwar period. 
The results of changing productivity trends over various subintervals of 
the postwar period are shown by the letter designations in the stub of the 
table. Thus, for example, equation (9b) refers  to the equation (9) form of the 
model with separate trends allowed for the two subperiods 1948-56 and 
1957-70. The estimates for equation (9b) are shown in the middle bank of 
columns, labeled equation (9), and the second row, labeled (b). 
Alternative equations. Equation (7)  is  the  simplest form tested.  Esti- 
mates using it are shown in the first bank of columns in Table 2. The esti- 
mates in row (a) correspond to  equation (6), which is a special case of 
equation (7) in which the productivity trend is unchanged throughout the 
period. 
Equation (9) allows the relation between the output gap and the labor 
input gap to  vary with the weighted unemployment rate, which has the 
coefficient b2  in  the table. Estimates are shown in  the second bank of 
columns in Table 2. The estimates of the coefficient b2 have the right sign 
in the equation for every combination of subperiods, suggesting that there 
is some of the suspected effect: The productivity gains available from each 
increment of gap closing diminish as the gap itself gets smaller (or grows 
larger negatively). But while the expected sign persists, in no case is the 
coefficient estimate as much as twice as large as its standard error, and in 
most cases it is not larger than its standard error. In all cases, the standard 
error of  estimate of  the  equation is  worsened slightly rather than im- 
proved in the shift from the equation (7) to the equation (9) specification. 
Equation (11),  estimates for  which  are shown  in  the  third bank  of 
columns, allows the dynamics of employment change to affect the relation 
between output and employment. This amendment to the simple model 
yields better results. The positive coefficients estimated on the dynamic 
term are typically twice their standard error and the standard errors of 
estimate of  all the equations are smaller than their counterparts in the 
estimates from equation (7). 
The positive coefficients for the dynamic term predict the following pat- 
tern between labor input and output changes during a cyclical movement 
of the economy. Starting from a constant input gap, a surge of employment 
in one year will be accompanied by an especially large increase in output, George  L. Perry  551 
improvement in productivity, and reduction in the output gap. If the input 
gap remains unchanged in the second year, with its growth  just equal to its 
trend, it will be accompanied by a widening of the output gap and an 
increase in productivity slower than trend. If the input gap continues un- 
changed in the third year, output and productivity will grow at their trend 
rates and the output gap will remain unchanged. If input growth is espe- 
cially slow in the fourth year and input gap widens, there will be an espe- 
cially slow growth in output and productivity and an especially large in- 
crease in the output gap. 
Alternative productivity trends. The  most  striking thing  about  com- 
parisons of different rows in Table 2 is how favorably the estimates in row 
(a) compare with the others. These estimates constrain the productivity 
trend to take on a single value for the whole postwar period. Allowing the 
data to set different productivity trends for different subperiods, as is done 
in rows (b) through (g), usually increases the standard error of estimate of 
the equation. In the estimates in the third bank, which employ the dynamic 
labor input gap term, no alternative  improves at all on the overall fit of the 
row (a) equation. 
In the third bank, equation (1 If) is of special interest because it gives 
the most strikingly different  results from the other equations, and it fits the 
data virtually as well as equation (1 Ia). It breaks the period after 1953, 
a peak year of very low unemployment, and again after 1961, a recession 
year. This produces a trend estimate of productivity growth in the 1954-61 
period substantially slower than the trend either before or after that. It also 
leads to an estimate of virtually no pure gap effects on productivity, which 
is both doubtful a priori and inconsistent with all other estimates of this 
effect in the table. Finally equation (1 if) makes a prediction error on pro- 
ductivity in 1970 twice as large as that of equation (11  a). 
Thus, the results reported in Table 2 lead me to accept the hypothesis 
that the weighted productivity trend was constant throughout the postwar 
period. There is no reason to reject the row (a) estimates in favor of any 
others. 
PRODUCTIVITY  TRENDS 
Equation (1la)  can be used to  provide estimates of productivity and 
output trends. Two  adjustments are necessary to  produce estimates in 
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defined by a constant weighted unemployment rate, to the potential path, 
defined by a constant official unemployment rate. This conversion is dis- 
cussed below in connection with estimating potential output and is not 
quantitatively important for estimates of productivity trends. The second 
adjustment is basic to  the method used here. Equation (I Ia)  says that, 
throughout the  postwar period, weighted labor productivity grew at  a 
constant rate of  about 3 percent a year along the trend path. But this 
means that trend labor productivity as commonly measured-using  un- 
weighted manhours-varied  as  the  relation between weighted and  un- 
weighted trend manhours varied. This proposition in turn implies a growth 
rate of trend productivity slower than 3 percent throughout the period, 
since the relative importance of low-weight employees grew. It also implies 
that the growth rate changed in various periods since the relative composi- 
tion of employment did not change at the same rate throughout. Table 3 
shows the effect of these shifts on conventionally measured productivity 
growth along the potential path. The annual rate of productivity advance 
slows from 2.9 percent in  1948-55 to  2.7 percent in  1955-65 and to 2.4 
percent in 1965-70. 
Table 3.  Growth in Potential Output, by Source, 1948-70 
Annual growth  rates in percent 
Output  and sources  of growth  1965-70  1955-65  1948-55 
Potential  output  4.16  3.53  3.90 
Sources 
Potential  employment  2.41  1. 17  1.53 
Potential  average  hours, total  -0.67  -0.36  -0.53 
With constant  employment  mix  -0.53  -0.29  -0.48 
Effect  of employment  mix  -0.14  -0.07  -0.05 
Potential  productivity,  total  2.39  2.71  2.87 
With constant  employment  mix  2.93  2.97  2.99 
Effect  of employment  mix  -0.53  -0.25  -0.11 
Addendum 
Effect  of employment  mix 
on potential  output  -0.67  -0.32  -0.16 
Trend  output  4.13  3.45  3.90 
Source: Calculated by author; see text. Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
Potential Output 
Equation ( lla)  is  used to  calculate potential  output for the postwar 
years. The steps used in these calculations are as follows: George L. Perry  553 
1. The weighted unemployment rate that would prevail along the poten- 
tial path was estimated for each year based on disaggregated unemploy- 
ment totals by age-sex categories. (Along the potential path, the weighted 
unemployment rate declined noticeably from the mid-1950s to  the late 
1960s.) 
2.  The potential labor force by age-sex categories was then calculated 
using the unemployment coefficient in the participation rate equations to 
adjust the trend labor force. Weighted potential employment was calcu- 
lated from this and combined with estimates of potential average hours 
from equation (2) to produce an estimate of potential labor input. 
3.  Potential output was calculated by fixing it equal to actual real GNP 
in the third quarter of 1955 and projecting the years before and after 1955 
by using the growth rate of potential labor input each year in equation 
(lla). 
VARIATIONS  IN  POTENTIAL  OUTPUT  GROWTH 
Table 3 summarizes  the growth rate of potential output and the sources 
of this potential growth for three subperiods of the postwar years. For the 
1955-65 decade, it confirms  the 3.5 percent potential growth rate that Okun 
had estimated. And it indicates that, in the earlier  postwar period, potential 
had grown at nearly a 4 percent rate. But, of greatest interest, it shows why 
potential output growth accelerated by only 0.6 percentage point in the 
1965-70 period compared with the previous decade, despite the strong evi- 
dence in Table 2 that trend-weighted productivity did not slow down in 
recent years and despite the jump of 1.2 percentage points in the growth 
rate of the potential labor force and employment. 
During 1965-70, shifts in the composition of the work force reduced the 
average workweek  by  0.07  percentage point  a year more than in  the 
previous decade. In addition, the downward trend in the length of  the 
workweek independent of such relative employment shifts was 0.24 per- 
centage point faster than during the previous decade. Thus 0.31 percentage 
point of employment growth was offset by a faster decline in the trend of 
average hours. At the same time, the changing composition of the work 
force  reduced the  growth  of  productivity-or  the  growth  of  effective 
employment as measured by productivity weighting-by  0.28 percentage 
point more than during the previous decade. Together these hours and 
productivity effects offset half of the 1.2 percentage point acceleration of 
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The yearly estimates of potential GNP in current prices are shown for 
the postwar period in Table 4, along with actual GNP and the gap between 
potential and actual. In Figure 1, the difference between potential GNP 
based on the model of this paper and the official estimates of potential 
GNP  are shown for the period from 1952, the first year for which official 
estimates are available, up to  the present. The discrepancy between the 
two  estimates is largest at the  start and end  of  the  period, but is  not 
particularly large at any point. However, the present estimates indicate a 
Table 4.  Potential and Actual GNP, 1948-70 
Dollar  amounts  in billions  of current dollars 
Gap 
Dollar 
Year  Potenitial  GNP  GNP  Percent  amount 
1948  $  267.4  $257.6  3.8%  $  9.8 
1949  276.6  256.5  7.9  20.2 
1950  292.0  284.8  2.5  7.2 
1951  324.6  328.4  -1.2  -3.8 
1952  343.8  345.5  -0.5  -1.7 
1953  360.5  364.6  -1.1  -4.1 
1954  379.0  364.8  3.9  14.2 
1955  399.0  398.0  0.2  1.0 
1956  426.3  419.2  1.7  7.1 
1957  458.1  441.1  3.8  17.0 
1958  485.1  447.3  8.5  37.8 
1959  510.3  483.7  5.5  26.6 
1960  536.7  503.7  6.5  33.0 
1961  562.7  520.1  8.2  42.6 
1962  589.2  560.3  5.1  28.9 
1963  617.8  590.5  4.6  27.3 
1964  651.0  632.4  2.9  18.6 
1965  688.9  684.9  0.6  4.0 
1966  736.8  749.9  -1.7  -13.1 
1967  792.3  793.9  -0.2  -1.6 
1968  857.5  864.2  -0.8  -6.7 
1969  937.2  929.1  0.9  8.1 
1970  1,030.8  974.1  5.8  56.7 
Sources: Actual GNP-U.S.  Office of Business Economics, The National Inicome  and Product  Accounts  of 
the United States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables (1966), Table 1.1, and Survey of Current  Business, Vol. 51 
(July 1971), and July issues for 1968, 1969, and 1970; potential GNP-derived  by author from equation 
(1 ta) discussed in text. George L. Perry  555 
Figure 1.  Difference between  Present Estimates and Official Projections 
of Potential GNP, 1952-70 
Difference  (percent  of potential) 
0.6 






1952  1954  1956  1958  1960  1962  1964  1966  1968  1970 
Sources: Derived from formula  where Q  =  potential GNP  estimated in this paper and Q. 
Q 
official estimate of potential GNP. 
slightly smaller gap during the 1955-65 interval than the official estimates 
do. And they indicate a more rapid growth of potential between the early 
1960s and the present. 
GNP Gaps and Okun's Law 
The GNP  gap based on the potential output path can be decomposed 
into its employment, average hours, and productivity components using 
the same equations that were used to estimate potential GNP. At a point 
in time, a lower unemployment rate is associated with a larger labor force 
and employment level and longer average hours of work. These add up to 
a higher level of labor input, measured by weighted manhours. And this, 
in turn, is associated with a higher level of labor productivity. The higher 
levels of labor input and productivity measure the higher level of output 
that would be produced. Thus, specific estimates of each of these effects 
can be used to derive a relationship between the output gap and the unem- 
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The increased employment associated with a reduction of one point in 
the unemployment rate can be estimated from the participation rate equa- 
tions given in the appendix. Because disaggregated labor force data were 
used in the model, this relationship will vary slightly from year to year. 
For recent years, a one point difference in the unemployment rate implied 
about a 1.35 percent difference in weighted employment. From equation 
(2), a one point difference in the unemployment rate is associated with a 
0.45 percent difference in  average hours of work. When the hours and 
employment effects are added together, weighted labor input is  greater 
by an estimated 1.8 percent for each 1 percentage point differential in the 
unemployment rate at a given point in time. 
Equation (11) implies a  relation between the productivity and labor 
input gaps of the following form: 
(12)  =  (b -  1)(-  )  +  C [(MH) 
- 
H_ 
With b estimated at  1.25 in equation (lla),  the permanent elasticity of 
weighted productivity with respect to labor input is only 0.25. Together 
with the 1.8 percent rise in labor input, this implies that only a 2.25 percent 
output gap is associated with one percentage point in the unemployment 
rate. Equation (12) also shows that a substantial additional gain in output 
and productivity would initially accompany a closing of the gap, since c 
is equal to 0.33, making the elasticity of productivity 0.58 in the first year 
the  employment  gap is  narrowed. But  this  additional effect would  be 
transitory. If equation (7a) is accepted in place of (1 Ia), the permanent 
elasticity of weighted productivity to labor input is 0.40, although the effect 
in the first year is smaller since there is no lag term. Together with the 1.8 
percent difference in labor input, this implies that a 2.52 percent output 
gap accompanies each point in the unemployment rate. With the labor 
input effect estimated here, an elasticity of output to labor input of  1.78 
would be needed to reach the 3.2 multiplier between the output gap and 
the unemployment rate that was estimated by Okun. None of the estimated 
values of b in Table 2 approaches that magnitude. 
ALTERNATIVE  SPECIFICATIONS 
The  model  of  this  paper basically  asks what  potential  output  level 
would accompany the potential unemployment rate. Okun really asked the George  L. Perry  557 
opposite question: What output gain is needed to  achieve a target, low 
unemployment rate? The Okun's law multiplier depends on which question 
is asked. 
A  model of  output and productivity similar in form to  equation (11) 
can be specified in terms of the second question. Keeping equation (3), 
which states that the productivity trend is constant, and changing equation 
(10)to 
(13)  l 
where the expectation is that 0 <  m <  1, and n <  0, yields an estimating 
equation of the form 
(14)  ln  (H)  =  K +  mrT, +  m log (Q) 
+  n [log  (-Q)-  log (Q)t1] 
(where K is a constant), which implies a relation between the productivity 
and output gaps of the following form: 
(15)  p  =  (1-m)(-Q) 
-  [(Q)  -t  (Q  ) 
The permanent elasticity of productivity with respect to labor input is 
given by (1 -  m)/m, with some additional transitory change in the same 
direction in the first year the gap changes, just as with equation (11). 
Estimates from equation (14) fitted to the same period as equation (1 a) 
show the following parameter values: 
r=  2.98 
m=  0.68 
n  =  -0.18 
1-m  =  0.32 
(1 -  m)/m  =  0.47. 
The weighted productivity trend is still estimated to grow by 2.98 percent 
yearly, yielding the  same potential  GNP  path estimated with equation 
( lla). The Okun's law multiplier is now 2.7, with weighted productivity 
rising by 0.86 percent along with the  1.8 percent rise in labor input for 
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Finally, the importance of the choice of question can be seen from esti- 
mates that retain the model of equation (11), but make output an inde- 
pendent variable. Doing this leaves the estimated productivity trend at 2.97 
but raises the estimate of b from 1.25 to 1.56 and lowers the estimate of c 
from 0.33 to 0.18. Thus, once again, the same potential GNP path is pro- 
jected. But the Okun's law multiplier  is now raised to 2.8 for permanent  gap 
changes, while the additional transitory change in output and productivity 
is reduced. Even this estimate falls well short of Okun's original 3.2. 
It is important to emphasize that the estimates of potential output shown 
in Table 3 are unchanged by any of these alternative specifications of the 
relation between employment and output. The potential path was calcu- 
lated using the productivity trend, which is estimated to be just under 3.0 
percent a year in  all the  variants discussed. Similarly, estimates of  the 
size of the output gap, as well as the associated shortfall of  actual em- 
ployment, hours, and productivity from their values on the potential path, 
are the same for all variants since they are calculated as the difference 
between potential values, which are the same in all variants, and actual 
values in any year. However, in any year the error in explaining actual 
productivity will depend on the equation used, since each predicts some- 
what different  responses of productivity to deviations of the economy from 
the potential path. 
RECENT  GNP  GAPS  AND  PRODUCTIVITY 
In 1970, the estimated GNP  gap, as shown in Table 4, was 5.8 percent 
of actual GNP,  or about $57 billion. An unusually large part of this esti- 
mated gap was associated with the fact that productivity was below its 
projected potential level. Average hours were 0.44 percent below poten- 
tial; employment was 1.43 percent below potential; and productivity was 
3.87 percent below potential. The employment shortfall represented 1.2 
million jobs. Of these, 420,000 were the additional jobs associated with the 
larger labor force that would have been expected with the economy oper- 
ating  at  its  potential,  and  750,000  represented a  reduction in  current 
unemployment. 
The GNP gap was negative in 1966 and 1968, virtually zero in 1967, and 
0.9 percent of GNP in 1969. The only other years in the postwar period 
with negative GNP gaps were 1951 through 1953. 
On the basis of present evidence that real GNP is rising by a little less George  L. Perry  559 
than 3.0 percent in  1971, the output gap will have grown to  about 7.3 
percent for the year, or to an estimated $77 billion in current prices. This 
is about  $5 billion larger than the official estimates based on the same 
actual GNP.  If output expands at a 5 percent annual rate in the fourth 
quarter of the year, the gap in that quarter will be about $78 billion. The 
data needed to separate this output gap into the shortfall in labor input 
and the shortfall in productivity that exist in 1971 are not yet available. 
But the evidence that productivity growth in the private nonfarm sector 
has been rising rapidly indicates that low productivity will account for a 
smaller part of the total output gap in 1971 than it did in 1970. 
Recent productivity. The  poor  performance of  productivity over the 
1965-70 period that has attracted so much attention can now be broken 
down into several components. During the previous decade productivity 
growth had averaged 2.75 percent per year. At that rate, it would have 
grown by 14.5 percent by 1970; but it grew only 8.4 percent, leaving a 5.3 
percent shortfall from a naive projection of past productivity trends. Of 
this shortfall, 1.5 percent is attributable to the acceleration that occurred 
in the employment of women and young workers relative to  prime-age 
men. According to equation (1 la), another 1.9 percent is accounted for by 
the predicted effect of slow growth of demand over this interval, and 1.9 
percent is the unexpected shortfall in productivity (the error for 1970 from 
that equation). According to the estimates from equation (14), 2.7 percent 
is accounted for by the predicted effect of slow growth over the interval 
and 1.1 percent by the unexpected shortfall in productivity (the error for 
1970 from that equation). This equation, which predicts a larger produc- 
tivity difference between actual and potential output, correspondingly pre- 
dicts lower productivity in 1970 and oence has a smaller error in that year 
when actual productivity was extraordinarily  low. The substantial produc- 
tivity gains noted for 1971 will make up at least some of the unexplained 
shortfall shown by both equations for 1970. 
A Look Ahead 
PROJECTED POTENTIAL  OUTPUT 
With equation (lla),  potential output growth can be projected over the 
decade of the 1970s. For this projection, the estimated time trends in the 
participation rate equations had to be relied on to project the future labor 560  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
force by  age-sex groups. The projections used as benchmarks the 1970 
estimates of  potential participation rates, which in turn were based on 
actual 1970 labor force data. No change was assumed to take place in the 
relative  unemployment rates  among  age-sex  groups  at  potential.  The 
resulting employment projections by age-sex category were weighted by 
relative wages as before. Changes in potential average hours were esti- 
mated from equation (2) and adjusted for the effect of changing employ- 
ment mix by age-sex categories. The age-sex adjustments were not  sub- 
stantial in the projection period. 
On these assumptions, potential output grows at a rate of between 4.2 
and 4.4 percent each year in the 1970s. For the decade, potential output 
growth averages  4.3 percent annually, an indisputable  record for any decade 
in recent history. If the price deflator rises at an average annual rate of 2.5 
percent over this period, potential GNP in current prices would reach $2 
trillion by the end of the seventies. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  PREDICTIONS 
The projections of potential output growth in future years can be used 
to predict the unemployment rate that would accompany alternative rates 
of economic expansion. Since the aim is to predict employment for assumed 
output paths, equation (14) is used in this projection. For each output path 
considered, labor input is predicted from the equation and the labor input 
gap is calculated for each year. The official unemployment rate is then 
calculated from 
(16)  Ut =  1.8 (  HH)  +  4.05 
(where A is potential labor input), since 4.05 percent is the official unem- 
ployment rate at potential and 1.8 percent of labor input gap is associated 
with one point in the unemployment rate. 
For  1972 and 1973, potential output is projected to grow at its fastest 
rate in the postwar period, averaging approximately 4.4 percent yearly. If 
real GNP grows at a 5 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 1971, 
calculations based on equations (15) and (16) predict a 6.0 percent official 
unemployment rate for the year, indicating they are tracking quite well. 
If real output continues to grow at a 5.0 percent rate in the following eight 
quarters, the unemployment rate is predicted to continue at 6.0 percent in George  L. Perry  561 
1972 and to decline to only 5.8 percent in 1973. This is a surprisingly  slight 
improvement  in unemployment in face of a rate of economic expansion that 
is substantially faster than the economy has experienced for some time. 
If real GNP growth proceeds at a 6.0 percent rate after the end of 1971, 
unemployment is projected to average 5.8 percent for all of 1972 and 5.3 
percent for 1973. On this expansion path, the unemployment rate would 
reach about 5.5 percent by the end of  1972. If expansion proceeds at a 
7.0 percent rate starting in 1972, unemployment is predicted to average 5.7 
percent in that year and 4.8 percent in 1973. By these estimates, a rapid rate 
of expansion will have to be sustained for several years in order to restore 
full employment. 
APPENDIX 
Labor Force and Employment  Data 
Definition  and  Census  Changes 
The labor force concepts used in this study cover all persons aged 16 and 
over, including those in the armed forces. Some adjustments have been 
made to the official data. First, the official population, labor force, and 
employment data from the Current  Population Reports (CPR), subdivided 
by age-sex groups, were adjusted for the 19501  and 19602  census population 
benchmark  changes. The data were assumed correct in the most recent cen- 
sus (for example, 1960). The estimates for 1960 based on the 1950 census 
measured the error in the 1950 census for 1960; and years between census 
dates were adjusted on the assumption that the error grew  linearly between 
census years. Second, the data for the labor force and employment were ad- 
1. See U.S. Bureau  of the Census, Current  Population  Reports,  Series  P-57, No. 129 
(1953), pp. 5, 12. 
2. See Employment  and Earnings,  Vol. 8 (April 1962), p. xvii. 562  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
justed for the definition changes introduced by the Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics in 1967. The overlapping  data for 1966 provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics were used to make the adjustment.3  These data provide estimates 
of employment and the labor force on both the old and new definitions. The 
ratio of the two estimates in the overlap period was applied to data for pre- 
vious years to put all series on the basis of present definitions. 
Linkage  to Establishment  Data 
Employment totals  from the Office of  Business Economics, based on 
establishment reports and expanded to cover sectors excluded by those re- 
ports,4 were used in the measure of labor input of this study. For each year, 
discrepancies between this employment total and the total derived from the 
adjusted data in the CPR series described above were allocated among 
secondary workers (all but males aged 25 to 64) according to the share of 
employment  of  each  age-sex group in  total  employment  of  secondary 
workers. The same discrepancy was allocated to the labor force in each 
group.5 In this way, labor force and employment subtotals for each age-sex 
group were derived, adding up  to  the  "establishment-Denison  basis" 
totals used here. 
Table A-1 compares series on the total labor force and unemployment 
rate based on these adjustments  with the official series. The unemployment 
rates differ primarily because the armed forces are not  included in the 
official series. The adjustments described above have only a slight effect on 
unemployment rates. 
3.  Employment and Earnings, Vol.  13 (February 1967), pp. 3-30. 
4. The expanded  totals were kindly provided by Edward F. Denison from a draft 
manuscript  of a forthcoming  study. The establishment  data appear in U.S. Office of 
Business  Economics,  Thle  National  Income and Product Accounts  of  the  United States, 
1929-1965:  Statistical  Tables (1966), Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6, and in Survey of  Current 
Business,  July issues, Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6. 
5. This procedure  amounts  to assuming  that the discrepancy  is a reporting  error  in the 
employment  estimates of secondary  workers  in the CPR series. Alternatively,  it could 
have been assumed  to arise  from variations  in multiple  job holding,  resulting  in a some- 
what  different  allocation  of the discrepancy  among  age-sex  groups.  Since  either  secondary 
workers  or second  jobs would receive  low weights  in converting  to the labor input mea- 
sure used in this study, and since both would be cyclically  sensitive  totals, it makes  little 
difference  for the end result  which  adjustment  is made.  The evidence  that the discrepancy 
was due to systematically  variable  multiple  job holding  was not persuasive. George L. Perry  563 
Table A-1. Derived Labor Force and Unemployment  Rates Compared 
with Official Data, 1948-70 
Labor  force data in thousands 
Labor  force  Unenmployment  rate 
Year  Derived  Official  Derived  Official 
1948  61,737  62,080  3.5%  3.8% 
1949  61,816  62,903  5.7  5.9 
1950  63,125  63,858  5.1  5.3 
1951  65,756  65,117  3.0  3.3 
1952  66,879  65,730  2.7  3.0 
1953  67,691  66,560  2.6  2.9 
1954  67,653  66,993  5.1  5.5 
1955  68,453  68,072  4.0  4.4 
1956  69,867  69,409  3.8  4.1 
1957  69,923  69,729  4.0  4.3 
1958  69,957  70,275  6.4  6.8 
1959  70,474  70,921  5.2  5.5 
1960  71,555  72,142  5.2  5.5 
1961  72,236  73,031  6.4  6.7 
1962  72,889  73,442  5.2  5.5 
1963  73,872  74,571  5.4  5.7 
1964  75,010  75,830  4.9  5.2 
1965  76,789  77,178  4.3  4.5 
1966  79,529  78,893  3.5  3.8 
1967  81,216  80,793  3.7  3.8 
1968  83,019  82,272  3.4  3.6 
1969  85,126  84,239  3.3  3.5 
1970  86,253  85,903  4.7  4.9 
Sources: Derived data are discussed in the text of this appendix. The official data are from Manpower 
Report of the President, April 1971, pp. 203, 223. 
Potential Labor Force and Employment 
Table A-2  shows the participation rate equations used to estimate the 
potential labor force. In order to project potential employment disaggre- 
gated by age-sex groups, an assumption was needed about how individual 
group unemployment rates would be distributed at potential. Experience 
suggests that proportional changes for all groups would understate the 
change for groups with high unemployment, while the same percentage 
point change for all would overstate it. I chose an adjustment  lying between 564  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
Table A-2.  Coefficients  for Labor Force Participation Rate Equations 
Labor  Standard  Serial 
market  Time  error  correla- 
Age-sex  tightness  trend  of  tion co- 
group  Constant  I  -  u*  log T  W2  estimate  efficient 
Males 
16-19 years  0.0695  1.2961  -0.3268  0.910  0.0126  0.775 
(0.3243)  (0.2676)  (0.0950) 
20-24years  -0.3548  0.9373  0.1524  0.781  0.0157  0.903 
(0.4787)  (0.3183)  (0.1740) 
25-64 years  1.0232  0.0106  -0.0405  0.805  0.0024  0.872 
(0.0684)  (0.0488)  (0.0237) 
65 years and  1.4900  0.4393  -0.7254  0.985  0.0089  0.860 
over  (0.2522)  (0.1839)  (0.0855) 
Females 
16-19 years  -0.5172  0.9871  -0.0121  0.565  0.0141  0.547 
(0.3296)  (0.3128)  (0.0670) 
20-24 years  -0.7945  0.4991  0.3781  0.881  0.0120  0.866 
(0.3420)  (0.2466)  (0.1172) 
25-64 years  -1.2908  0.4780  0.5750  0.987  0.0055  0.759 
(0.1395)  (0.1171)  (0.0397) 
65 years and  -0.0889  0.0821  0.0511  0.436  0.0056  0.739 
over  (0.1399)  (0.1197)  (0.0385) 
Source: Based on official  labor force data, adjusted  as described  in the text of this appendix. The dependent 
variable is the fraction of the population in each group that is in the labor force. The form of the equations 
and the results are discussed in the section, "Participation Rates," in the article text. All regressions were 
fitted to annual data for 1947 to 1969. The standard errors of coefficient estimates are in parentheses. 
these extremes: For each age-sex group in each year, I calculated the "total 
unemployment rate," defined as the sum of recorded unemployment plus 
hidden unemployment (the difference between the trend and actual labor 
force for the group) as a ratio to its trend labor force. At a point in time, 
this total unemployment rate was assumed to change proportionately for 
all age-sex groups. The size of the proportionate change in each year was 
calculated by constraining the total weighted unemployment rate to be 3.37 
percent, its constant value along the trend path. Then the same proportional 
changes in employment were maintained in shifting from the trend to the 
potential path. Since the groups that experience relatively high unemploy- 
ment rates also experience large changes in labor force participation as 
unemployment varies, this way of adjusting individual rates to their po- George L. Perry  565 
tential levels falls between the extreme methods of adjustment mentioned 
above. 
Potential employment in each age-sex group for each year was multiplied 
by the relative wage of workers in that group. These wage-weighted  employ- 
ment estimates for each group were added together to get weighted poten- 
tial employment for the whole economy. Actual weighted employment was 
estimated in a parallel manner by adding actual wage-weighted employ- 
ment over all age-sex groups. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Edward F. Denison: I am a little embarrassed because to discuss Perry's 
paper I must discuss my own recent research. It consists of another growth 
study of the general type I have made before, with numerous improvements 
and refinements.  It provides annual estimates for the United States covering 
the postwar period, 1947-69, and a few prewar  years on a comparable basis. 
In any such study, the first prerequisite is to  obtain output and input 
measures that are as statistically consistent as possible. It is a great ad- 
vantage that the Office of Business Economics (OBE) series on compensa- 
tion of employees is matched by an employment series based on the same 
sources and processed in the same way.  OBE's estimates of proprietors 
are also a series as consistent with proprietors' income as one can obtain. 
To maximize consistency between input and output, I measured output 
from the income side of the accounts (if one starts from the expenditure 
side the deflated statistical discrepancy is subtracted) and used OBE em- 
ployment data as the main basis for an employment series. Conceptually, 
the series is on a labor force basis, to permit a tie-in with labor force char- 
acteristics obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS), but the 
movement is based essentially on the OBE employment data. While my 
employment series differs from the CPS employment series, the differences 
are not in long-term trends, nor in cyclical movement to any great extent. 
The main difference  is that there are periodic changes in their relative levels: 
One is above the other for a number of years, then they cross over for 
another series of years, again reverse, and so on. 
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Hours are based on establishment data from the Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics (BLS), related to this employment series. A small adjustment, based 
on unpublished BLS estimates, converts hours paid for to hours worked. 
So much for background. 
Perry  has picked up my employment and hours series for his analysis. He 
obviously must use an "actual" labor force series that is statistically con- 
sistent with employment, and has obtained it by adding to employment an 
estimate of unemployment. I am convinced that, besides having the merit 
of consistency with output, this is a better time series for the labor force 
than the CPS series. Perry also required a consistent series for the potential 
labor force. To  obtain it he needed an age-sex distribution of the actual 
labor force, which he  derived by  scattering the  difference between the 
actual labor force as estimated and the CPS series among the groups whose 
labor force participation rates fluctuate. 
One result of Perry's analysis particularly interested me: When the new 
labor force series is used, a cyclical response of the labor force to the un- 
employment rate remains. Until he conducted his analysis I had no idea 
whether this response would appear. I completely agree with Perry's pro- 
cedure of measuring the potential labor force by starting from the actual 
and adding or subtracting the gap or surplus. 
Perry's next problem was to obtain a cyclically adjusted average hours 
series. His  rather arbitrary solution was to  break the period into  three 
pieces and use a trend value for each. He might do a little better up to 
1965 by looking at employment components. Until then the main changes 
in average hours resulted from compositional shifts in employment from 
farm to nonfarm, from men to women, from full-time to  part-time work, 
and so on. However, the big drop after 1965 was not compositional alone; 
hours dropped within homogeneous  groups. I have no real criticism of 
Perry's  procedure. Any way one handles the recent period will be arbitrary. 
The projection assumes the old rate of decline in hours starting from 
the new lower level. Because changes in hours are likely to be discrete rather 
than gradual, they are essentially nonprojectable over periods of five or ten 
years or less. Nevertheless, given the assignment, I should probably have 
made the same assumption. 
The rest of the study involves attempts to measure a trend rate of pro- 
ductivity change and cyclical fluctuations in productivity. I would not say 
Perry's results are necessarily wrong, but I must raise some questions. The 
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economy, his measure of productivity, is so summary a measure that it is 
hard to analyze it, draw any conclusions, or appraise the results. 
Perry and I agree in some sense on one statement: There has been no 
important acceleration or deceleration in the rate of productivity increase 
during the postwar period. If there has been any change, it was small. The 
trouble is that we define productivity in such different ways that if one of 
us is right, the other is in all probability wrong. Also, when I consider the 
three periods Perry distinguishes, I obtain a lower rate of change in the 
middle period than in the other two, while he does not. 
Both series attempt to eliminate cyclical movements, but otherwise they 
are quite different. Perry defines productivity as GNP  per hour worked, 
weighted by age and sex, in the economy as a whole. The series in which 
I  find stability is  confined to  the  nonresidential business sector of  the 
economy, and within this sector measures output per unit of total input 
after the effects of shifts of resources out of labor and out of nonfarm self- 
employment, of cyclical movements, and of minor sources of irregularity 
are eliminated. 
My first point concerns the size of the sector covered: Unless by chance 
all sectors march side by side, trouble arises in dealing only with the econ- 
omy as a whole. The government-household-institution  sector is measured 
differently, behaves differently,  and affects all numbers differently  from the 
business part of  the economy.  Output per manhour in that  sector has 
increased about one-third of a percent per year, much lower than the rate 
in the nonresidential business sector, and its share in the total has shifted 
up and down. Aside from the difference  in the rate of productivity change, 
shifts in the importance of the sectors themselves affect their combined 
output per manhour. 
In a large part of the economy, consisting of the services of dwellings plus 
income from abroad, output is produced with almost no manhours at all; 
it is entirely a product of capital. Output of these sectors should be elimi- 
nated to analyze output per manhour, and added back to obtain output in 
the entire economy. A  rise in the proportion of  output in these sectors 
raises output per manhour in the whole economy; a decline reduces it. The 
proportions have changed rather substantially over this period and not at 
a constant rate. 
A broader point concerns what one is trying to do in this type of analysis. 
I start with the proposition that changes in manhours are only one of many 
determinants of output. One should go on to take separate account of all George L. Perry  569 
the determinants that affect output, or output per manhour, that can be 
identified and measured annually. What is left is a residual whose growth 
one seeks to analyze for trend. 
Perry has taken account of one such determinant, the age-sex composi- 
tion of hours worked. He says that other determinants, such as education 
or capital, are also important but that they generally change smoothly and 
can be allowed to ride in the residual productivitity trend. 
I have tried to measure directly the effects of a much larger number of 
determinants. Table 1 presents some comparisons between Perry's results 
and mine. His numbers, however, refer to the whole economy, mine to the 
nonresidential business sector, which represents about four-fifths of total 
national income, on the average; Perry refers to potential hours, while I 
deal with hours actually worked. 
Line 1 shows growth rates of Perry's  labor input per man, which changes 
only because of age-sex composition. Below it are three of my series. These 
are total labor input per person employed; total  input per person em- 
ployed; and total input per person employed plus the effects of shifts out 
of agriculture and self-employment. 
Table 1.  Comparison  of Perry and Denison Measures of Annual  Growth 
Rates of Input  per Man and per Manhour,  1948-70a 
Percent 
Chlanzge  Change 
to niext  to nzext 
Type  of measure  1948-55  period  1955-65  period  1965-70b 
Input  per man 
1. Labor input, Perryc  -0.62  0.01  -0.61  -0.57  -1.18 
2. Labor input, Denison  0.51  -0.36  0.15  -0.43  -0.28 
3. Total input, Denison  0.86  -0.40  0.46  -0.39  0.07 
4. Total input plus resource 
reallocation,  Denison  1.24  -0.44  0.80  -0.34  0.46 
Intpuit  per manhour 
5. Labor input, Perryc  -0.11  -0.14  -0.25  -0.28  -0.53 
6. Labor input, Denisonc  0.08  -0.29  -0.21  -0.20  -0.41 
7. Total input plus resource 
reallocation,  Denison  1.66  -0.51  1.15  0.18  1.33 
Source: See text. 
a.  The Perry measures concern the potential for the whole economy and potential hours;  the Denison 
measures, the actual for the business sector only and actual hours worked. 
b.  Perry: 1965-70; Denison:  1965-69. 
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Line 7 can be viewed as my estimate of the effects on output per man- 
hour in the nonresidential business sector of  all the factors that can be 
identified and measured annually, of which age-sex composition is only 
one. Now,  the levels do not  affect Perry's analysis; what matters is the 
change from one time span to the next (the second and fourth columns). 
It turns out that changes in the growth rate of Perry's labor input per 
manhour are not at all similar to changes in the growth rates of the sum of 
all my separately identified factors per manhour shown in line 7. 
While my calculations have yet to be completed, I suggest that the age- 
sex calculation, although appropriate as far as it goes, may give a dia- 
metrically erroneous indication of the effects on output per manhour of all 
identifiable and measurable factors in total input and resource shifts. 
My last general point concerns the method of adjusting the data to un- 
tangle trend and cyclical movements. Table 2 is designed to  show how 
different our numbers are in Perry's first period. 
I first set down our growth rates of actual output per manhour in the 
whole economy, whose differences lie only in the measure of output. Al- 
though Perry measures output by GNP and I by national income, the dif- 
ference between our estimates, shown in lines 1 and 3, is not due mainly to 
the difference  in definition. Inclusion of line 2 brings out the fact that most 
Table 2.  Comparison  of Perry and Denison Measures of Annual  Growth 
Rates of Economy-wide  Output per Manhour, 1948-70 
Percent 
Type  of measure  1948-55  1955-65  1965-69  1965-70 
Actual  output  per manhouir 
1. GNP (product  side), Perry  3.45  2.75  ...  1.63 
2. GNP (income side), Denison  3.27  2.85  ...  1.64 
3. GNP, national  income accounts  basis 
(income side), Denison  3. 19  2.88  1.79  ... 
Potential  output  per manhour 
4. GNP (product  side), Perry  2.87  2.71  ...  2.39 
5. GNP, national income accounts  basis 
(income side), Denison  3.31  2.66  2.81  ... 
Actual  less poten7tial 
6. Perry  (line 1 minus  line 4)  0.58  0.04  ...  -0.76 
7. Denison (line 3 minus  line 5)  -0.12  0.22  -1.02  ... 
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of the difference results from my measuring output from the income side 
while he measures it from the product side. It happens that for these par- 
ticular periods, especially for a comparison of 1948-55 with 1955-65, the 
choice makes a big difference. 
Line 4 shows the growth rate of Perry's potential output per manhour 
and, for a rough comparison, line 5 gives a series constructed from my 
estimates. I adjusted actual output in the nonresidential business sector 
each year to what it would have been if the labor and capital present had 
been used at a constant rate of utilization, added this to actual output in 
the other sectors, and divided by actual total hours in the whole economy. 
The point of the table is to be able to compare lines 6 and 7, obtained by 
subtracting the growth rates of potential from those of actual output per 
manhour to obtain the effect of the cyclical adjustment. 
Our numbers are, perhaps, not very far apart for the later periods. But 
they are very different for the first period. I estimate that 1948 saw a mod- 
erately more intense use of resources than 1955. Perry's growth rate of 0.58 
over seven years implies that output per manhour in 1955 was roughly 4 
percent higher than it would have been with the 1948 utilization rate. 
To be sure, lines 7 and 6 are not estimates of precisely the same thing. 
Line 7 estimates what output per manhour of the hours actually worked in 
each year would have been if they were not affected by changes in utiliza- 
tion, whereas line 6 provides a measure of what the output of all the poten- 
tial hours would have been. Still, I don't think very big differences in the 
numbers can be explained this way. 
In seeking a means to  adjust productivity for changes in intensity of 
utilization, it seemed to me that the series most likely to be affected by 
such changes in the same way and at the same time as productivity was 
profits, or more precisely, the nonlabor share of corporate national income 
when depreciation is measured in current prices and on a consistent basis. 
I used this series to estimate the fluctuation in productivity. My approach 
was to compute a logarithmic trend for the most refined series on output 
per unit of input I could obtain, and compute an arithmetic trend (which 
is slightly downward) for the nonlabor share. Deviations of productivity 
and the nonlabor share from their trends were correlated, and the regres- 
sion was used to estimate from the nonlabor share the effects of intensity 
of utilization on, productivity each year. The correlation is pretty good; 
jR2 is 0.90. I also superimposed another adjustment to eliminate the effect 
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the nonlabor share itself. This refinement changed some of the numbers a 
little, but not very basically. 
What were the alternatives? In his initial study, the portion of Okun's 
law reflecting the adjustment for productivity was obtained by a relation- 
ship to unemployment, as were the rest of its components. In Why Growth 
Rates  Differ, I picked up the productivity part of Okun's formula, although 
I was unhappy with it. In the process of my current study, with the advan- 
tage of more years of data, I tested it and there was no correlation at all 
between productivity  and unemployment; the calculation comes out literally 
as close to zero as one ever gets. 
Another possibility was the change in hours worked from one year to 
the next, which performed better than unemployment but still not very 
well, giving improbable answers in some years. Then I tried both unem- 
ployment and the change in hours, and this worked no better than the 
change in hours alone. There are good reasons why the change in hours 
should not be a satisfactory indicator. For example, labor hoarding reduces 
productivity but raises hours worked so the causation is often backward. 
In his analysis here, Perry  first uses the unemployment rate. I suspect this 
does nothing for him at all. I checked directly on the relationship between 
output per manhour for the whole economy and the unemployment rate. 
The correlation is for all intents and purposes zero, and only trivially better 
if his weighted unemployment rate is used. True, I used national income as 
an output measure but this shouldn't matter unless the statistical discrep- 
ancy and unemployment are highly correlated. Perry also  introduces a 
measure of the change in hours not worked. This helps quite a bit, but 
only about as much as the change in hours in my analysis. The two mea- 
sures are close substitutes and either is helpful only in periods of rapid 
expansion. I doubt that Perry has as good a measure of utilization as one 
can get. In many years his method will yield estimates close to those ob- 
tained by my procedure but in occasional years-particularly  those like 
1953 or 1957 that embrace the beginning of a downturn-it  yields a very 
different, and I believe worse, answer. The  1948-55  movement revealed 
in Table 2 suggests his results are quite different from mine, but I have not 
seen estimates for all the other years. 
I do not want at this point to say that any of Perry's conclusions or his 
projection is wrong, yet I am reluctant to accept them as right. The whole 
operation is  insufficiently detailed to  permit  much evaluation, and the 
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As a final comment about the very recent period, I think it interesting 
that, after allowing for variation in intensity of utilization, neither of us 
finds any drop in the rate of productivity  increase-in  my case through 1969 
and in Perry's through 1970. The differences  in measuring inputs discussed 
above are probably not very important in this short-term examination of 
very recent changes. 
Robert M. Solow: When Perry first introduced the weighted employment 
concept in his inflation paper last year, I felt an impulse to suspend judg- 
ment about it because I was worried about whether it was a concept that 
simply happened to meet the requirements of the moment and might not 
last. Now  I think that the success with which the weighted employment 
concept comes out here also lends, in my mind, more credibility to the 
analysis in the inflation paper as well. Not that there is any logical connec- 
tion between the two, but the concept seems to me to be paying off. 
Next, I agree with Perry that there is no evidence whatever in his paper 
for moving away from the hypothesis of a constant weighted productivity 
trend in the period. Only one equation in his Table 2 yields any worthwhile 
difference,  and I mean worthwhile rather  than statistically significant. Some 
differences  shown in the table are not worthwhile in the sense that they are 
trivial and well within the specification error of any model of this kind. 
Equation (llf),  the one equation that does yield a worthwhile difference, 
is suspicious on other grounds. 
Finally, when it comes to accounting for the relatively slow growth of his 
measured potential between 1965 and 1970, Perry puts a quarter of 1 per- 
centage point of the rate of growth on the unusually fast reduction of aver- 
age hours. In the model, this comes from the dummy variable for 1966-68 
which, as Perry says perfectly clearly in the paper, is strictly ad hoc. In a 
sense it is still unexplained. It is just that the data seemed to call for this 
kind of unusual reduction in hours during that period. There is probably 
something to it, although I do not understand why it happens. It helps ex- 
plain another mystery-the  decline (or, at best, the failure to rise) of real 
spendable weekly earnings of production workers between 1965 and 1970, 
even while real hourly compensation has been rising. Presumably, a good 
chunk of the reason lies in the autonomous reduction in hours for which 
we have no special explanation. 
One question I have is why Perry's potential output grows faster than 
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too,  as Denison  was, but in  obviously quite a different way, about the 
1948-55  comparisons because Perry's productivity figures imply a  gap- 
closing productivity gain in that interval, yet the official unemployment 
rate was lower in 1948 than in 1955. 
The discrepancy between Perry's and Denison's numbers that I would 
like cleared up is that Perry's series for the rate of growth of output per 
unit of his labor input looks constant on his potential path; and Denison's 
series for the rate of growth of output per unit of total input is, he says, 
constant along his potential path. The difference between these is the rate 
of  growth of Perry's labor input per unit of Denison's  total input. The 
difference between two constants should be constant. But Denison  says 
this difference is not. 
To finish up, I have two very brief comments on some of the material 
relating to the Okun multiplier. Perry points out that he can formulate this 
model  in  different ways, essentially interchanging dependent and inde- 
pendent variables, and get slightly different  results for the Okun multiplier. 
If either weighted hours or output were treated as exogenous in the model, 
it ought to be the independent variable. In the present case, I presume one 
would take output as the independent variable on the assumption that the 
causality runs from output to hours, with output in turn given by product 
demand. But it would be better still to imbed this analysis in a somewhat 
more complete model of the economy in which some variables were clearly 
exogenous, and then estimate the complete system. 
George L. Perry:  Let me first try to respond to the array of results and 
observations Denison has offered. On the question of what output concept 
to use, I went directly to total GNP because that was what I was interested 
in. Measuring it from the input side is one alternative.  I doubt that it makes 
a difference  in analyzing potential since the two concepts differ only by the 
statistical discrepancy, although it  can make  a noticeable difference in 
measuring actual output  or productivity changes between two  years. I 
accept Denison's  comment that  a  productivity analysis is  cleaner if  it 
excludes some parts of GNP, particularly those for which we measure or 
impute output that involves no labor input. But sectoral shifts are a part 
of all observed changes and are important even within the nonfarm busi- 
ness sector. Weighting labor input, as I have done, takes account of shifts 
from the input rather than the output side. If the growth of an imputed 
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period, it could still affect the results. I have treated such changes as grad- 
ual in dealing with total GNP and in allowing their effects to appear in the 
trend term. 
The Perry and Denison concepts that are displayed side by side in Deni- 
son's Table 1 are so different that they are hard to compare. Denison uses 
actual data for part of the economy and compares them with my data on 
potential for the economy as a whole. Where we are closest to measuring 
the same thing, labor input per manhour, the big disparities in our changes 
between the first and second periods are worth noting. These probably 
reflect the large residuals that exist in the first few years in my analysis. 
Then, productivity moved erratically, even after adjustment for cyclical 
variations in unemployment. Thus, growth rates such as his, using actual 
data over a few years, will vary sharply according to which of the early 
years one starts with. Growth rates along my potential line will not. 
The differences  between Denison's series on labor input and his series on 
total input plus resource allocation indicate that everything but labor input 
grew unevenly when measured per hour of labor input. If some of these 
other factors are treated as fixed inputs, some uneven movement would be 
accounted for by the fact that manhours vary cyclically along the actual 
path. In any case, without a careful study of Denison's work it is hard to 
know what to make of this as a comment on my results. 
The nearest that we can come to comparing our work is in the data on 
potential growth rates given in Table 2. Here our results on economy-wide 
productivity trends are summarized using conventional manhours in both 
cases. Yet  the comparison is still elusive, because of  two  essential dif- 
ferences. 
First, what Denison calls potential is not what I call potential; the two 
are defined differently. His potential is defined by making the nonlabor 
share a prescribed fraction of total income-almost,  but not quite, a con- 
stant fraction through the years. My potential is defined by holding the un- 
ployment rate at a fixed level each year. 
Second, I am purposely measuring along a smoothed trend line. Denison 
is measuring  from the end points of a potential path calculated by adjusting 
actual productivity in each year for his estimate of underutilization each 
year (defined by the ratio of the actual nonlabor share to his trend value 
for this share). 
Our most substantial and important disagreements center on the last 
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put measured from the product and the income sides, our differences  in the 
first two periods are rather small despite all the differences in concept and 
definition. But for the crucial last five years, our disagreements matter for 
we say significantly different things about what has happened recently to 
productivity and where the economy would be if it were at "potential." 
Here I find Denison's results implausible if he means them to  apply to 
something near my concept of potential. In this period, the trend in produc- 
tivity per manhour in my analysis slows by 0.32 percentage point from the 
earlier period. In Denison's figures, the trend quickens by 0.15 percentage 
point. My numbers imply a constant productivity trend on my labor input 
basis, which produces the decline in the trend on an unweighted manhour 
basis since so many women and young workers entered the work force 
over this interval. If instead I accept Denison's numbers for unweighted 
manhour productivity, and take them to apply to what I mean by potential, 
the productivity trend on my labor input basis jumps by 0.47 percentage 
point in this period rather than remaining constant. I find a productivity 
revolution of this size implausible on the face of it and inconsistent with all 
the statistical evidence in my paper. While I am only speculating, I suspect 
Denison's  1969 end point is the main source of our difference. The non- 
labor share was at recession levels that year. I suspect that low profits were 
an even bigger surprise than low productivity-that  is, the unexplained 
residual in profits was greater. And if this is so, Denison adjusted produc- 
tivity up by more than he should have. 
The answer to the first of Solow's questions-Why  is the 1948 to  1955 
actual productivity gain larger than the gain on the potential path?-has  to 
do again with the residuals for the earliest years, which reflect erratic  move- 
ments of measured productivity and make actual end-point calculations 
misleading. With my data,  1948 shows a positive output gap measured 
using the trend line, despite a very low unemployment rate; 1950 shows a 
much smaller output gap despite an unemployment rate that is 1.6 percent- 
age points higher. Actual productivity growth from 1948 to 1955 averages 
more than trend even though, without residuals, we could expect growth 
slower than trend because of some gap opening between those years. Ac- 
tual productivity growth from 1950 to 1955 averages  the same as trend even 
though, without residuals, we would expect growth to be faster than trend 
because of gap closing between those years. One should not take such calcu- 
lations from these early years too seriously. 
Solow also asks about the comparison of my estimates with the official George L. Perry  577 
estimates of potential output growth. The official series grows more slowly 
because, as near as I can tell, it is not measured accurately.  The ingredients 
of the official estimate are unclear. I think that, as the growth in the labor 
force surprised the Council of Economic Advisers each year, they moved 
the potential path up a little bit. They did not make the full leap at any 
one time because to retain the rest of the trend calculation-the  average 
hours and productivity trends-while  accepting the evidence on the  ac- 
celeration of the growth in the labor force would have moved potential up 
very rapidly, as I have indicated. The surprising thing is that they came 
out pretty close,  by sheer luck perhaps, since the ingredients that would 
allow a calculation of the change in the productivity trend measured con- 
ventionally were never part of the analysis. The unemployment rate and 
Okun's law surely kept them compromising on how fast to move up the 
potential path and kept them in the ball park. Basically it was telling them 
that  something was holding down  potential  output growth despite the 
acceleration in the labor force. 
Finally, there is the question of which productivity trend has really been 
"constant." I make no claims beyond those discussed in the paper for the 
constancy of productivity trend on the basis of my input measure. Statisti- 
cal tests designed to find significant  changes could not shake the hypothesis 
that the trend was  constant throughout the period  (although what  in- 
significant  evidence there was indicated a slowdown in recent years, while 
Denison  implies an acceleration). I  have seen no  statistical evidence of 
constancy on  Denison's  concept.  Conceivably, we  could  both  be right 
since he does not mean by potential the same thing that I mean. But with- 
out seeing a great deal more of his analysis, including how he measures 
the  contribution to  potential  output  of  capital,  education,  and  other 
things, I cannot say whether I would accept this coincidental result. If I 
may borrow his phrase, I would not say Denison's results are necessarily 
wrong, but I must raise some questions. 
General Discussion 
Arthur Okun noted that Perry's results on the Okun's law multiplier 
were not surprisingly different from his own. He noted that his original 
work had shown differences in the multiplier similar to those shown by 
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which sought to estimate the unemployment rate if output grew 1 percent 
faster than potential, gave a multiplier of around 3.2; asking what output 
gain accompanied a one-point reduction in the unemployment rate gave 
a multiplier of around 2.5. The difference comes because the correlations 
are not perfect, and they are similar to Perry's differences. He also had 
suspected that if lags were allowed explicitly, as in Perry's equation (11) in 
contrast with (7), some of what is attributed to the level of the gap would 
turn out to result from changing the gap. This helps account for the lower 
level of both of Perry's multipliers compared with Okun's original esti- 
mates. 
R. J. Gordon suggested that it would be useful to try to introduce the 
possible  influence of  wage  and price expectations into  the  labor force 
participation equations to  see if they helped explain the unusual rise in 
participation rates of recent years. This calculation would help decide if the 
high participation  rates were permanent or transitory. He also suggested, as 
a possible explanation of the drop in hours in 1966-67, that tight labor mar- 
kets may have induced an unusual number of women who ordinarily  would 
not work at all to take up part-time  jobs in retail trade and services, and 
that this effect would vanish when employers could hire full-time personnel 
in a slacker labor market. He believed this may have been happening in 
1971. 